This paper considers which parties appeal in tax cases and which parties win such appeals. It adapts party capability theory to derive hypotheses concerning the relative advantages of (certain types of) taxpayers and HMRC, and how this may be aected by institutional factors, such as requirements for permission to appeal, and factors associated with the resources of the parties, such as legal representation. These hypotheses are then tested, using statistical methods, on a dataset assembled by the author of all appeals (including further appeals) from Special Commissioners' decisions since 1981. In doing such this paper both questions what the functions of an appeal system are, and whether the appeal system satises these, as well as addressing the question of whether certain large corporates enjoy favoured treatment by HMRC, which has been a recent issue of public concern in the UK.
Introduction
This paper examines appeals from the decisions handed down between 1981 and 2009 of the Special Commissioners, the tax tribunal that generally heard the most complex tax cases. The outcome of such cases is clearly important to the parties but it has a much broader public importance, due to their value as precedents. This is due to the rule of stare decisis, discussed further in section 2 below, whereby such decisions generally bind the court that handed down the decision and inferior courts in subsequent cases. Additionally, such cases have a general signicance, since by shaping the law they inuence other taxpayers' liabilities in non-litigated matters both in disputes that are settled outside litigation as well as in circumstances that do not give rise to disputes. 1 Further, it is important to understand which cases are appealed, since it is only in those cases that parties choose to appeal that the courts have the ability to mould the law and there is no reason to suppose that the cases that are appealed to any court are a representative sample of the cases heard in the court below. Also, as discussed further in section 7 below, if a type of party has a greater propensity to appeal losses than its adversary then it has the potential to shift the law in its favour, even if the superior court is no more generally disposed in favour of that party than the court/tribunal whose decisions are appealed. Clearly, knowing the way cases that are appealed are actually decided also assists our understanding of whether the appeals process shifts the law in a particular direction.
Despite the importance of understanding how the dynamics of the appeals process shapes the law, such empirical legal research has generally been restricted to studying appeals in the United States and even where the courts of other countries are studied, they are mainly studied by American academics using the same theories and methods used to study American appellate courts.
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Yet there are important dierences, even between the US and the UK. For example, in the US the general rule is that each party bears their own legal costs, regardless of whether they win or lose, although in tax cases even in the US adverse costs are generally available.
2 By contrast, as discussed further in section 2 below, the indemnity rule in the UK generally requires the unsuccessful party to pay the winning party's legal costs. The UK rule on adverse costs might therefore be expected to deter economically weaker parties from appealing, since they might be expected to be more risk adverse. In turn, as discussed in section 7 below, this may result in the law shifting in favour of the economically stronger party. This paper therefore contributes to the existing literature by considering how the particular institutional framework in the UK aects the dynamics of tax appeals and the case law that is thereby developed.
Whether certain categories of taxpayer enjoy an advantaged position in their dealings with HMRC (the UK tax authority) has become a major issue of public concern in recent years. This has prompted enquires by both the Public Accounts Committee 3 (PAC) and the National Audit Oce 4 (NAO) into certain settlements made by HMRC, most prominently with Goldman Sachs and Vodafone. This paper contributes to this public policy debate by considering how features of the appeal process (such as the rules on cost or permission) and factors associated with the economic resources of the parties (such as legal representation) might lead to certain parties winning more cases and thereby shaping the law in their favour. This paper is in 8 sections, the rst of which is this introduction. The second section sets out the institutional structure to appeals from Special Commission- 2 ers' decisions and how this changed over the relevant period. The third section discusses the theoretical background, using party capability theory as originally developed in a seminal article by Marc Galanter. 5 This takes as a starting point Galanter's categorisation of litigation between the IRS and the taxpayer as being an example of litigation between a one shotter and repeat player , which would normally advantage the IRS as a repeat player. It also discusses how being an RP might cause the tax authority to play for precedent, rather than just the tax in issue in that particular dispute. Galanter's model is then problematised by considering how this position of advantage might be evened out or even reversed, in the case of some taxpayers, through factors including a better bargaining position (due to being credibly able to threaten migration from the UK) or even through access to expensive legal representation. Section 4 builds on this using a rational choice approach to develop falsiable hypotheses in relation to who appeals, who wins on appeal and how these may be aected by requirements for permission to appeal and by dierent legal representation.
Section 5 introduces the dataset of onwards appeals from Special Commissioners' decisions since 1981, on which the hypotheses generated in Section 4 are tested in section 6. Section 7 considers whether the appeal system itself favours particular parties either due to one type of party having a greater propensity to appeal or due to judges at one level being more/less disposed to the taxpayer than their brethren at other levels. The paper concludes by considering the merits of the present four-tier appeal structure, standardised across each of the constituent nations of the UK following the introduction of tax appeals into the new tribunal structure in 2009. It considers the functions of an appeal system and argues that such an extensive appeals structure serves no useful purpose, especially since so many cases are appealed to the higher levels.
Legal Background
The Special Commissioners were the tribunal which generally heard the most complex rst-instance direct tax appeals, until 2009 when their jurisdiction was transferred to the unied tribunal structure created in the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Despite the changes in the appeals system, the signicant continuity of personnel and procedure means that this study remains relevant.
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In consequence of tax pervading most forms of human endeavour, the topics litigated before the Special Commissioners were extremely varied. 19 House of Lords Standing Order IV; Practice Direction 1.9. 20 In the HL leave was granted to petitions that raise an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House at this time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the subject of judicial decision and reviewed on appeal :
Practice Directions Applying to Civil Appeals (House of Lords), Direction 4.8. In contrast, since the Access to Justice Act 1999, the CA will not give permission unless it considers that (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice; or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. Access to Justice Act 1999 s.55(1); CPR, r.52.13(2). (rather than just the ones that were appealed) were reported. The reason for distinguishing between these two sets is discussed in the penultimate paragraph of section 5, below.
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were free to depart from the reasoning of their brethren in earlier cases. Other courts were generally bound by their own precedents, as were the courts below them. The one exception to this was the HL. Although the HL had regarded itself as being free to depart from its own precedents since the 1966 Practice Statement, 21 as a practical matter it rarely did so.
The general rule in English litigation is that the losing party not only has to pay their own legal fees (known as costs ) but has also to pay the legal fees incurred by the successful party (known as adverse costs ). The way that tax law applies to the complex facts in these cases is far from clear-cut. . . This contrasts with the simpler tax aairs of small businesses or individuals where the law, and how it applies to the case, are usually clearer.
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Galanter speculated that being a repeat player gave litigants an advantage for a number of reasons. These include specialised expertise, economies of scale, bargaining credibility and the ability to structure transactions.
32 Indeed, this view was echoed by the Tax Law Review Committee, who also noted that being a repeat player gave the Revenue the ability to choose to litigate the case that they were most likely to win, when there were several potential disputes in relation to an issue.
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Galanter theorised that one consequence of being an RP is that they might play for the rules in addition to (and sometimes in preference to) the outcome of particular disputes. precedents, is likely to be so for any revenue authority, who might have several disputes engaging the same set of rules, in addition to future revenues being contingent on the rules in dispute. In contrast playing for the rules is less likely to be important for the taxpayer, even those who are RPs. This is because their dispute with HMRC may concern a one-o transaction, or they may be able to structure future transactions to avoid the rule in question.
Galanter did not argue that RPs were synonymous with the haves but 
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Whilst the foregoing somewhat anecdotal evidence does suggest that large corporates might enjoy favourable treatment, it should be noted that Sir Andrew Park's report on ve large tax settlements concluded that they were all reasonable and indeed one was relatively advantageous to HMRC.
41 Perhaps, however, the robustness of Sir Andrew Park's conclusion should be taken with some caution, since the disputes he considered often concerned highly factual issues and at one point the NAO report states that Given the scope of his review, Sir Andrew Park could not consider all the extensive evidence prepared for the hearing.
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In summary, it would generally seem that HMRC's position as an RP would generally give it an advantage in litigation against taxpayers and would also result in it often playing for the rules rather than just the tax in issue in that particular dispute. Further, it would seem that HMRC's advantaged position might be reduced or reversed in its dealings with large companies, due to such companies themselves being RPs or due to the size of that company's contribution to the UK tax base giving them a strong bargaining position.
Legal representation
With regard to legal representation, Galanter noted that the existence (and use of ) a specialist bar might help the OS player overcome some of the gap in experience. 43 Galanter argued that lawyers tended to specialise in representing either OS or RP. Further, those that represented OS tended to have some distinctive features , including that:
they tend to make up the lower echelons of the legal profession.
Compared to the lawyers who provide services to RPs, lawyers in these specialties tend to be drawn from lower socioeconomic origins, to have attended local, proprietary or part-time law schools, to practice alone rather than in large rms, and to possess low prestige within the profession.
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and that:
the episodic and isolated nature of the relationship with particular OS clients tends to elicit a stereotyped and uncreative brand of legal services.
45
In UK tax cases it would be expected that this specialisation occurs to some degree, but it is highly questionable whether lawyers representing the taxpayer possess the distinctive features that Galanter outlines.
At the level of the Special Commissioners it was possible for litigation to be conducted (and indeed common for it to be) by professions other than solicitors, such as accountants. But for appeals from Special Commissioner's decisions it was not possible for such other professionals to do so. 
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Given the cab rank rule, it is somewhat odd that silks should need to be persuaded to appear for the Crown. The answer to this conundrum would seem to be that they feel they can refuse instructions from the Crown under the exception to the cab rank rule that the remuneration oered by the Crown is not a proper professional fee .
52 Indeed, the author is aware of one QC who refers to his appearances for HMRC as his pro bono work, as he regards such fees as small compared to what he can charge the taxpayer. Indeed, it would appear that the reticence to appear for the Crown is purely nancial and not ideological. One tax silk told the author how members of his chambers enjoy receiving instructions tied in white tape.
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This price dierential also applies to junior barristers, who can charge a higher rate to taxpayers than the panel rate they are allowed to charge the Crown. Such price dierential would seem a potential example of market failure. costs would often be externalised (as adverse costs in onwards appeals from the Special Commissioners) to the taxpayer if they were successful. Indeed, such expenditure could be thought more justiable for HMRC for two reasons.
First, as an RP, a victory for HMRC would be likely to set a direct precedent in other identical cases so the total nancial gain would be a multiple of the actual award in that case. Second, Alan Paterson's research into the role of advocacy in the House of Lords suggests (at least there) that advocacy rarely aects the outcome of a case, but only the reasoning that the judges use to arrive at the outcome.
54 As discussed above, as an RP, HMRC should care not just for the outcome but the reasoning behind it ( play for the rules ) as these may set a precedent for cases which, while not identical, raise similar legal issues.
Conversely, the taxpayer would be more interested in the outcome rather than the reasoning behind the outcome. If advocacy aects the reasoning rather than the outcome it would therefore seem to follow that it would be more valuable to HMRC than the taxpayer and that they should be willing to pay higher fees for better advocacy.
Perhaps the answer to this conundrum is that the higher fees tend to be charged by barristers who are specialists in tax law. Conversely, often the counsel instructed by HMRC have a more general practice. This adds value for taxpayers since they are themselves not experts in tax law (unlike HMRC). Such an argument is developed in Hypothesis 6, below. It has also been suggested to the author that (historically) the Revenue were reluctant to instruct barristers in sets specialising exclusively in tax law, due to a perceived fear of them being leaky , ie there was a perceived risk that information might be passed to taxpayers that HMRC wished to keep condential. Historically, another reason for few junior specialist tax counsel being instructed by the Revenue might have been that to get on the Attorney General's panel it was to have contentious experience in more than one area of law, but many tax counsel's experience was limited to tax litigation (or sometimes even non-contentious tax advice).
By way of illustration of this client specialisation, in rst appeals from pre- able to recover the costs of successful litigation. A possible explanation is that the expensive lawyers are tax specialists who add value for the taxpayer, but would not add value for HMRC, due to their internal tax expertise.
Hypotheses
This section develops some of the ideas discussed in the previous section into falsiable hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested in section 6 of the paper.
These hypotheses fall into three groups. Hypotheses 1 and 2 consider whether an appeal is made; hypotheses 3 and 4 concern the outcome when an appeal is made; and hypotheses 5 and 6 concern factors (requirements for permission and the nature of legal representation) that can moderate the eects of hypothesis 3 and 4. Examining these dynamics allows us to understand the process of the formation of precedent in tax cases and whether certain taxpayers are at an advantage, as discussed in the introduction.
Hypothesis 1: HMRC will be more willing to appeal losses against OSs (such as individuals and executors) than RP (PLCs and foreign companies). Some anecdotal evidence discussed in section 3 suggests that large corporate taxpayers enjoy favored treatment from HMRC, although as noted this conicts with the perhaps more considered view of Sir Andrew Park. Assuming this to be the case, it might be expected that HMRC might be less willing to challenge losses against such taxpayers in order to keep their good will (and taxable presence in the UK). Admittedly, the nature of the cases between these dierent taxpayers is likely to be very dierent, with vastly more tax in issue in the case of large corporates. This may well counterbalance the hypothesised result.
Hypothesis 2: RP (such as PLCs and foreign companies) will be more willing to appeal losses against the revenue authority than should OS (such as individuals and executors). Large corporates will have more resources. They will also have the ability to more easily externalise all aspects of the litigation, so whether to pursue it becomes a purely nancial question, rather than involving the undoubted aspects of stress that it might cause an individual taxpayer. Further, with such large corporates, the sums in dispute are likely to be large relative to the cost/adverse cost implications of continuing the litigation. However, the overall amount in dispute may be a smaller relative to their net wealth than for other taxpayers so loss aversion is less likely to have the consequence of deterring them from litigation. Accordingly, once such a taxpayer has decided to commence litigation, they are less likely than other taxpayers to stop, until they have exhausted possible appeals.
Hypothesis 3: The majority of appeals by the Crown will be allowed. Since the Crown should generally play for the rules, it is not expected that they would choose to appeal cases that they would be likely to lose. This is especially so for rst appeals from the decisions of the Special Commissioners, since (as discussed above) these decisions do not create a binding precedent but an appeal from those decisions would. Creating a binding adverse precedent would clearly be 13 disadvantageous for HMRC, since it would inuence the overall amount of tax collected, not just the tax in that particular case. This reasoning also applies to subsequent appeals, as HMRC should not want to appeal these cases if they thought they were likely to lose as it would create a precedent at a higher level that it would be dicult to overrule. Rather they would wish to consider appealing a similar case that they were likely to win possibly due to dierent evidence or to seek a legislative change. Accordingly, for any given case that HMRC chooses to appeal we would expect the anticipated prospects of success to be a value greater than 50 per cent, it would therefore follow that the majority of appeals by the Crown would be allowed (although this reasoning does not indicate how much more than 50 per cent of appeals would be allowed).
Hypothesis 4: The majority of appeals by the taxpayer will be dismissed, especially at the level of the Special Commissioners. When the taxpayer considers that their prospects of success exceeded 50 per cent it will normally be rational for the taxpayer to appeal. However, it may also be rational when prospects of success are less than 50 per cent, provided that the expected monetary gain is high.
For example, assume a taxpayers' prospects of success are 40 per cent and the tax in dispute is ¿500,000. If the costs of the appeal were ¿30,000 with the possibility, say, of ¿20,000 in adverse costs the expected nancial gain from appealing is ¿170,000.
56 Clearly, this is very much a simplication for example it ignores the possibility of a second appeal by the Crown, ignores the stress and lost opportunity costs due to the time consumed by the litigation and presumes risk neutrality. Whilst these additional elements are clearly signicant, nonetheless, even allowing for such arithmetical complications in calculating overall utility, the logic suggests that for the taxpayer, who plays for the outcome and not the rules, it may be rational to litigate cases where the prospect of success is less than 50 per cent.
Applying this logic, appeals by taxpayers where there is a low prospect of success should be especially prevalent at the level of the Special Commissioners, since adverse costs are generally not awarded and so even a low prospect of success may result in there being an expected nancial gain from appealing.
Indeed, aside from the purely economic argument, especially in the case of individual tax payers, they might also be motivated to appeal by an emotional desire to vindicate a perceived right even when their case is objectively week. 14 it will drive you silly.
Mrs. Briggenshaw: I will appeal to the higher Court. Singleton, J.: I cannot stop you, if I would. The advice which I gave you was for your own good, I thought. That is all.
It would, generally, follow that most appeals by the taxpayer should be refused. This does not quite follow as a matter of logic, but requires certain other conditions 58 which, viewed realistically, are likely to be satised.
Corollary: the majority of appeals will be decided in favour of the Crown.
This follows from Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Hypothesis 5: Where permission to appeal is required, and such permission is not a mere formality, the magnitude of the eects predicted by Hypotheses 3-4 will be reduced. A requirement for permission to appeal should be expected to disproportionally restrict appeals where the prospects of success are low.
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Accordingly, such a requirement should reduce the numbers of unsuccessful appeals by the taxpayer. It should impact less upon appeals from the revenue authority, since (as predicted by Hypothesis 3) the Crown should be less likely to appeal where the prospects of success are low.
Hypothesis 6: The eect of legal representation on outcome will be more pronounced for the taxpayer than for the revenue authority. Whilst the revenue authority clearly have many internal experts on tax law, the taxpayer will generally be more reliant on external professional advisors for advice in relation to any tax litigation.
The taxpayer's prospects of success may be altered by the identity of their legal representative in a number of ways. Most obviously perhaps, by the representative's ability to convincingly present the taxpayer's case in written pleadings and oral argument. They will also rely on their representative's advice on prospects of success when deciding whether to settle or litigate and this is likely to depend on the cautiousness or bullishness of the lawyer. As the revenue authority will be experts themselves, they will be less reliant on external counsel. This would explain why they do not generally consider the higher fees of certain counsel worth paying. It would follow that the identity of HMRC's lead counsel would be associated with less variation in the outcome of appeals than the identity of the taxpayer's counsel.
Dataset
The hypotheses in section 4 are tested against a dataset, assembled by the author, which contains all the appeals to the Special Commissioners since they were rst reported in 1995, together with all statutory domestic appeals from 58 Other requirements would include that the judges in the court being appealed to are not more/less disposed, other things being equal, to one side than the court being appealed against. The variables in the dataset include the court; the date of the decision; the sub-area of tax law (taken from the head-note at the start of the Special Commissioner's decision); who the appeal was by; whether the appeal was allowed or dismissed; the identity of the judges; and the identity of the advocates and their call dates. The dataset includes a reference for each case, which is identical for the same case at dierent levels of appeal, to allow the progression of cases through the appeal system to be tracked.
Results
Hypothesis 1: HMRC should be more willing to appeal losses against OSs (such as individuals and executors) than RP (such as PLCs and foreign companies). Hypothesis 2: RP (such as PLCs and foreign companies) should be more willing to appeal losses against the revenue authority than should OS (such as individuals and executors). Table 2 shows the number and proportion of decisions lost by the taxpayer where that loss is appealed by the taxpayer, broken down by taxpayer entity types. It is apparent that individuals and executors are less likely to appeal (combined they appeal 16% of their losses) than large corporate entities such as foreign companies and PLCs (which combined they appeal 47% of their losses). Such dierence in proportions is statistically significant at all conventional levels of signicance (P<0.0001). Accordingly, there is statistical support for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The majority of appeals by the Crown should be allowed. In the entire dataset 52 per cent of appeals by the Crown are allowed, the statistics are 
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A detailed breakdown, by court, of the outcomes of appeals by the taxpayer is set out in tables 7 and 8 in the statistical appendix. In respect of both periods it is clear that the majority of appeals by the taxpayer are refused. For both periods this is statistically signicant at all conventional levels of signicance, ie it is possible to be condent at all conventional levels of statistical signicance that it is not attributable to chance that less than 50% of all appeals by the taxpayer are successful.
Corollary: the majority of appeals should be decided in favour of the Crown.
Overall 65 per cent of all decisions in the dataset are decided in favour of Crown.
The statistics are (respectively) 60 per cent and 67 per cent for the pre-and post-1995 parts of the dataset. Thus in respect of both periods it is clear that the majority of appeals are determined in favour of the Crown. This is statistically signicant at all conventional levels of signicance.
Hypothesis 5: Where permission to appeal is required, and such permission is not a mere formality, the magnitude of the eects predicted by Hypothesis 4-3 should be reduced, but not eliminated. As noted previously, a requirement for permission from the CA for second appeals to the CA was introduced with eect from September 1999. Prior to this such appeals were available as of right. 66 This data is summarised in Table 3 . It is apparent from the table that most of these applications for permission are refused. It is also apparent that appeals by the taxpayer are refused at a greater rate. This anticipated dierence is statistically signicant (P<0.05).
Since the requirement for permission to appeal to the CA does not appear, in practice, to restrict appeals it is unsurprising that since the introduction of the 
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However, due to the small sample size and the fairly low P value this might be thought indicative of there being a dierence in the proportions.
As noted the requirement for permission to appeal to the HL does appear to restrict appeals by taxpayer. As hypothesised, this appears to reduce the number of appeals by taxpayers before the HL that are lost. of appeals to the CA. Whilst not statistically signicant at the 5 per cent level (P=0.07), again due to the small sample size and the fairly low P value, this might be thought indicative of there being a dierence in the proportions.
Hypothesis 6: The eect of outcome on legal representation should be more pronounced for the taxpayer than for the revenue authority. This hypothesis was tested by using a form of regression analysis similar to that used for the construction of value-added school league tables, 68 but adapted to account for the outcome variable being discrete (win/lose) rather than a continuous score In contrast there is far more expected variation contingent on the identity of the taxpayer's representative, controlling for the other variables. The left most point, marked with a large x, is for the predicted probability of a successful appeal by the taxpayer representing themself in such a case. As might be expected, the expected probability of success for such taxpayers (13%) is much lower than that for a taxpayer represented by any of the lawyers in the dataset. Another indication that eect of dierent legal representation on outcomes is more pronounced for the taxpayer than for the revenue authority is the DIC statistic that was partly used to select the variables to include in the model.
The DIC statistic, discussed in more detail in part C of the statistical appendix, is a goodness of t statistic with lower values indicating a better t. Table   11 It should be noted that due to the relatively small number of cases per advocate, there is a fair amount of uncertainty regarding the eect of any given advocate, but the far bigger variation in expected probabilities for the taxpayer still supports the foregoing analysis. The inclusion of years' call of the lead advocates in the model did not prove signicant or improve the model t. This would suggest that the variation in outcome attributable to the individual advocate is not associated with factors highly correlated to their experience. As previously noted, there are two possible explanations of eects of the identity of the advocate on the outcome one being that the risk aversion/bullishness of the advocate inuences the decision to litigate or settle, the other being that it is attributable to dierences in the advocates' skills in presentation of the case. Whichever it is, the eect does not seem to apply to advocates appearing for the Crown perhaps suggesting the eect is due to the rst mechanism, since the eect of dierences in advocacy might plausibly still be expected to be present even when advocates appear for HMRC, yet the specialist knowledge of HMRC would make them far less dependent on the views of counsel as to their prospects of success in deciding whether or not to appeal.
Synopsis: In summary, the majority of appeals are decided in favour of the Crown however this is more attributable to the taxpayer appealing cases where they have low prospects of success (supporting Hypothesis 4) rather than the Crown being especially cautious as to which cases it appeals (Hypothesis 3 having limited support).
The increase in the success rate of appeals by the taxpayer to the CA since the introduction of the permission requirement is indicative that the permission requirement does tend to weed out some unmeritorious appeals, despite the proportion of HC cases having a second appeal (and hence third hearing) before the CA having increased over the period. However, as predicted, the eect of the permission requirement is far greater before the HL, where permission (where required) is far more dicult to obtain than from the CA, resulting in a majority of appeals by the taxpayer to the HL being allowed.
It appears that the identity of the Crown's counsel do not appear to eect the outcome of appeals, whilst the identity of the taxpayers' does. It would seem that the most plausible explanation is that the associated dierence in outcome is not attributable to the eect of advocacy, but rather it is due to dierences in bullishness and risk aversion in counsels' advice on the prospects of success with the taxpayer being particularly vulnerable in this respect as, unlike the 7 Are certain parties structurally disadvantaged by the appeals process?
This section considers two ways in which the appeals system might systematically favour parties. The rst way is if one party had a greater propensity to appeal than their opponents. The other is if judges at one particular appeal level were more predisposed to the taxpayer than their brethren at other appeal levels.
Imagine we played a game where an unbiased coin was thrown and I kept it if it was heads and you did if it was tails. However, under the rules after the rst throw either of us could demand it be re-thrown and we would be bound by the second throw. If I seldom asked for it to be re-thrown if I lost, but you often did if you lost, you would be likely to end up with more coins than me.
This would be so even though the coin was unbiased. Similarly if the revenue or (certain types) of taxpayer had a greater propensity to appeal than their adversaries, then it would lead to more disputes being ultimately decided in favour of that taxpayer which would also result in a shift of the law in favour of that kind of party. The two situations have some important dierences, but the basic principle is the same. were not appealed, and the disposal on rst appeal for all other cases and so ignores any second or subsequent appeal. The gure for two appeals is similarly calculated. This is something of a simplication as it ignores the fact that some appeals (where there was a leapfrog or from Scottish or Northern Irish appeals) were limited to two appeals. Similarly, if levels of appeal were restricted some unappealed decisions might have been decided dierently, due to dierent precedents existing. Yet this method provides a useful approximation.
It can be seen that the rst level of appeal somewhat reduces the number of cases disposed of in favour of the taxpayer, but further levels of appeal do not substantivly alter the proportion of cases disposed of in favour of the taxpayer.
Accordingly, it does not appear that judges at one level of the appeal system are any more disposed to the taxpayer than judges at any other level of the appeals system. Nor does it appear that any types of party is more likely to appeal than their opponent, which could also cause the appeal system to advantage a particular type of party.
ference (29 June 2012) one eminent practitioner expressed the view that the CA were especially hostile to the taxpayer in avoidance transactions.
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8 Conclusion: too many appeals?
A somewhat remarkable feature of the appeal structure described above is that it consists of four tiers and that appeals to the third tier are made on a regular basis. The Tax Law Review Committee noted that New Zealand was the only other county that they studied that had such extensive possibilities for appeals.
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The introduction of the requirement for leave 71 to appeal to the CA for onward appeals from the Special Commissioners, where it would be a second appeal, was to implement the recommendation of the Bowman report that one level of appeal should be the norm . The next highest was from the Chancery Division, 12 per cent of judgments being appealed to the Court of Appeal. However, both of these concern rst appeals, the court whose judgment was appealed being a court of rst instance, and so are to some degree unfair compassions. The better comparison is with appeals from the Employment Appeals Tribunal and the Immigration Appeal
Tribunal since both involve second appeals the statistics being respectively 1.92 and 0.91 per cent of their decisions being appealed to the CA. Admittedly, the dierence with these tribunals might not be (solely) due to dierent rates of permission granted by the CA but might also be attributable to dierences in the litigants' abilities to fund second appeals.
Clearly there are advantages in an appeals system that readily allows at least one level of appeal. These are set out in the Bowman report as consisting of a public and a private purpose:
The private purpose is to correct an error, unfairness or wrong exercise of discretion which has led to an unjust result. The public purpose is to ensure public condence in the administration of justice and, in appropriate cases, to: (i) clarify and develop the law, practice and procedure; and (ii) help maintain the standards of rst instance courts and tribunals.
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However, second and subsequent appeals may be thought less likely to positively contribute to these public and private purposes indeed they may introduce 70 Tax Law Review Committee, The Tax Appeals System (IFS, 1996) rather than correct errors, although it is to be hoped the correct more than they introduce. Further such appeals may create uncertainty and delay a litigant receiving the benet of a judgment to which he is entitled . The possibility of a third appeal is not necessarily a bad thing, but only not so if permission is given sparingly arguably at a rate not dissimilar to that for comparable appeals structures such as the Employment Appeals Tribunal and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. An appeal structure where 51 per cent of rst appeals are themselves appealed can properly be regarded as dysfunctional.
Similarly, the desirability of a four-tier appeals structure may be questioned. In the case of appeals from tribunals the Bowman report also considered that:
It is important for a route of appeal to exist to a court able to take a generalist approach, regardless of the number of previous stages a case may have been through. A tribunal might take a technical approach to a particular issue which might be out of step with the law in general.
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However, this does not provide a justication for appeals from the ChD, itself clearly a court able to take a generalist approach, to the CA. Nor does such reasoning provide a justication for second appeals from the UTT to the CA under the new tribunal structure since the new tribunal structure was introduced there have been ve direct tax appeals heard as second appeals by the CA which have been reported in Simon's Tax Cases, in each of these cases the UTT was chaired by a High Court judge. Indeed, in four of these ve cases the High Court judge sat with a tribunal judge, which might be thought to strike an excellent balance between specialist expertise and a generalist approach.
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Indeed, it can be legitimately questioned whether appeals to the courts from the Special Commissioners have added greatly to a generalist approach. Since most of the Special Commissioners were either former or current practitioners they will have been aware of the general law from their practice since it is quite impossible to advise on tax law ignorant of the general legal framework. Were it the case that appeals to the courts resulted in a more generalist approach, it might be expected that the proportion of non-tax cases cited in the court's judgments might be substantially greater than the proportion cited in the appealed decision of the Special Commissioners. Yet that does not appear to be the case. The fact is that judges on the whole there are a few honourable exceptions whom it would be invidious to name but amongst whom gests the courts taxing a generalist approach, or even seeing the provisions within the general framework of tax law.
Given the foregoing argument that extensive appeals are a bad thing, depriving parties of certainty and not signicantly improving the quality of outcomes, it might be questioned why the leapfrog arrangements outlines in section 1, above, were used so seldom. As noted only four appeals since 1985 (when it was introduced) took advantage of the possibility of leapfrog from the Special Commissioners direct to the CA. Similarly, there were only 4 instances of leapfrog from the ChD direct to the HL on appeals from the Special Commissioners decisions since 1981. Whilst the new tribunal structure does not have the possibility of such leapfrogs, it does have an alternative mechanism whereby the standard four-tier appeal structure can be reduced to three tiers the rst instance hearing can be transferred to the UTT in complex cases.
81 So far this possibility has been utilised in one reported direct tax case heard by the CA, resulting in it being a rst rather than second appeal.
When in practice, the author recalls sometimes suggesting a leapfrog appeal from the Special Commissioners to the CA. However, this was opposed by counsel who advised that it was desirable to have several bites at the cherry. Yet as argued in the discussion of table 4, above, neither the taxpayer nor Revenue appears (in general) structurally advantaged by having a more extensive appeals system. The only constituency that would appear to generally benet from such extended litigation are the lawyers. One recalls how Galanter argued:
Lawyers should not be expected to be proponents of reforms which are optimum from the point of view of their clients taken alone.
Rather, we would expect them to seek to optimize their clients' position without diminishing that of lawyers.
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Perhaps this is the explanation for the extensive appeals structure (and the underutilisation of mechanisms that can shorten it). Table 10 : Parameter estimates of a model predicting of whether there was a pro-taxpayer outcome of an appeal, controlling for controlling for log-words, whether the appeal was by the taxpayer, the judge hearing the case, the area of tax law, the lead counsel for the taxpayer and lead counsel for HMRC.
C Fitting the Model
A form of regression analysis was used to examine the partial eect of the independent variables on the expected probability of a pro-taxpayer decision.
The selection of independent variables was done by rst tting a non-hierarchical model including the log-adjusted word count and whether the appeal was by the taxpayer. Both variables were signicant at all conventional levels of significance. The model was then re-estimated as a hierarchical model, alternatively using all possible combinations of the classications in the 
